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In a time like the present, when political turmoil and 
allegations of government corruption dominate our news, the Freedom 
of Information Act (“FOIA”)1 should be on the forefront of every 
American’s mind.  FOIA was enacted in 1966 to provide the American 
public with the right to access information about certain government 
activities, thereby minimizing the risk of government secrecy and 
corruption.2 The United States Supreme Court has stated that the 
“basic purpose of the FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to 
the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against 
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”3  
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S., May 2000, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.   
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).  
2 See Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 
2005, S. 394, 109th Cong. (2005) (listing recent Congressional findings on FOIA).  
3 Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. (“NLRB”) v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 
214, 242 (1978).  
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Under FOIA, accessibility to information is based upon the 
fundamental principle that the American people have a “right to 
know,” rather than determined based on their “need to know.”4 Thus, 
FOIA requires government agencies to disclose information and 
records upon request and without question.5 While government 
agencies are still permitted to withhold from disclosure certain 
information that falls within one of FOIA’s nine exemptions,6 these 
exemptions are to be narrowly construed so as to promote the statute’s 
broad disclosure policy.7 Furthermore, federal courts may review an 
agency’s denial of a FOIA request to determine whether the 
information was improperly withheld.8  
 In 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit was faced with such a review in City of Chicago v. United 
States Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms (“ATF”), the first of what was to become a series of three 
cases decided by the court regarding the City of Chicago’s (the “City”) 
FOIA request from ATF.9 Pursuant to FOIA, the City had requested 
data contained in two ATF databases regarding the tracing and sale of 
firearms, and ATF had repeatedly refused to disclose all of the 
requested information to the City, claiming that various exemptions 
warranted its refusal.10  
In its first two opinions, the Seventh Circuit was a champion 
for public disclosure of the trace and multiple sales data, arguing 
                                                 
4 See S. 394 § 2.  
5 See Alan B. Morrison, Balancing Access to Government-Controlled 
Information, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 115, 117 (2006); Meredith Fuchs, Information 
Regulation: Controlling the Flow of Information to and from Administrative 
Agencies, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 144 (2006).  
6 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).  
7 See NLRB, 437 U.S. at 236; In re Wade, 969 F.2d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 1992).  
8 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).  
9 See City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago III”), 423 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2005); 
City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago II”), 384 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2004); City of 
Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago I”), 287 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2002).  
10 See Chicago III, 423 F.3d 777; Chicago II, 384 F.3d 429; Chicago I, 287 
F.3d 628. 
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incessantly that the public interest in the disclosure of this information 
far outweighed any private interest or other government justification 
for its withholding.11 However, in September 2005, the Seventh 
Circuit radically switched roles from a FOIA advocate to a FOIA foe 
in the court’s third and final City of Chicago opinion.12 In this final 
opinion, the Seventh Circuit held that Congress effectively changed 
the substantive law under FOIA, and completely banned the disclosure 
of this information to the public, by inserting a rider in the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 (“2005 rider”),13 granting 
the information in question immunity from legal process.14 In doing 
so, the court gave a significant and misplaced amount of weight to the 
apparent intent of Congress to ban the information from disclosure and 
quickly set aside established principles of statutory interpretation and 
construction to reach a convenient but faulty conclusion.15  
Part I of this Note sets out the factual and procedural 
background of the three City of Chicago decisions and details the 
reasoning and holding of each decision. Part II discusses the Seventh 
Circuit’s faulty interpretation of the 2005 rider in greater detail. Part 
III describes the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York’s more logical interpretation of the same statutory text. 
Finally, Part IV compares the two interpretations and examines more 
specifically the flaws and possible impact of the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation.  
 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO LITIGATION 
 
Since late 1998, the City of Chicago has attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to gain access to firearms sales and trace records 
                                                 
11 See Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 435-36; Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 637-38.  
12 See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 784.  
13 Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 2859-60, codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 923 (2004).  
14 Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 782.   
15 See id. at 780-82.  
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contained in two databases compiled and maintained by ATF.16 The 
City’s long and documented struggle to retrieve these records began in 
response to a separate action it brought against certain manufacturers, 
distributors, and dealers of firearms, who the City claimed created a 
public nuisance by intentionally marketing firearms to Chicago 
residents and other residents likely to use or possess the weapons in 
Chicago.17 The City alleged that the defendants’ conduct interfered 
with the City’s ability to enforce its gun control ordinances.18 
Therefore, pursuant to FOIA, the City requested specific information 
from ATF’s Multiple Sales and Trace Databases (“Trace Data”) in an 
effort to determine the distribution practices of these gun 
manufacturers and establish liability.19  
ATF is a law enforcement agency within the United States 
Department of Justice20 which, among other things, is responsible for 
the enforcement of federal criminal laws and the regulation of the 
firearms industry.21 The Seventh Circuit stated that “ATF has 
acknowledged that its missions include analysis of firearm distribution 
and trafficking patterns, aiding local governments to enforce their own 
gun control laws and informing the public of the nature and extent of 
                                                 
16 See City of Chicago v. ATF, 2001 WL 34088619, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 
2001).   
17 See City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago I”), 287 F.3d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 
2002); City of Chicago, 2001 WL 34088619, at *1; see generally City of Chicago v. 
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1148 (Ill. 2004) (holding in favor of the 
defendant by refusing to extend the law of nuisance to apply to the state and 
federally regulated firearms industry and stating that the regulation of the 
manufacture, distribution and sale of firearms should be left to the legislature, not the 
courts). 
18 See Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 631.  
19 Id. 
20 6 U.S.C. § 531-33 (transferring ATF from the Department of Treasury to the 
Department of Justice, with the exception of ATF’s administration and revenue 
collection functions, and establishing an explosives training and research facility 
with the Bureau.  ATF is now known as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives).   
21 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, About ATF, 
http://www.atf.gov/about/mission.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).  
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illegal gun trafficking.”22 These gun control laws include the Gun 
Control Act (“GCA”), which requires firearms manufacturers, 
importers, dealers and collectors to disclose certain information to 
ATF.23 As part of its duties, ATF then compiles and maintains the 
information in comprehensive databases.24 During the last decade, 
ATF has refused to disclose and has fiercely fought to prevent the 
disclosure of the content of these databases to cities, including the City 
of Chicago, and private organizations around the country.25   
The first database at issue in the City of Chicago litigation was 
the “Trace Database,” which as its name suggests contains information 
regarding the manufacture, distribution and purchase history of a 
particular weapon recovered by a law enforcement agency in 
connection with a crime.26 The second database, the “Multiple Sales 
Database,” contains information submitted to ATF by dealers on any 
non-licensed individuals who purchased two or more firearms from 
the same dealer within a five-day period.27 Despite the City’s repeated 
requests, ATF failed to provide the city with all of the requested Trace 
Data, citing numerous reasons why the information was exempt from 
disclosure.28 This four-year court battle in the Seventh Circuit ensued.  
 
A. Chicago I - The Applicability of Exemptions 6, 7(A) and 7(C) 
of FOIA 
 
The Seventh Circuit first became involved in the City of 
Chicago litigation in 2002, after the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois granted the City’s summary judgment 
                                                 
22 Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 637.   
23 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (2000).  
24 See Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 631-32.  
25 See City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago III”), 423 F.3d 777, 778-79 (7th Cir. 
2005); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 429 F.Supp.2d 517, 519-21 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006).   
26 See Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 631-32.  
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 632 (noting that ATF provided the City with some of the requested 
information, but withheld a significant portion).  
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motion and ATF appealed.29 The issues at both the district court level 
and the initial appellate review were whether certain FOIA 
exemptions, namely Exemption 6,30 Exemption 7(A),31 and Exemption 
7 (C),32 permitted ATF to withhold this information from the City.33 
Relying on the long established rule that exemptions to FOIA are to be 
narrowly construed, the Seventh Circuit reviewed each exemption and 
held that neither of the exemptions was applicable to the requested 
information.34 At the end of its analysis, the court firmly stated:  
 
Inherent in the City’s request for records is the public’s 
interest in ATF’s performance of its statutory duties of 
tracking, investigating and prosecuting illegal gun 
                                                 
29 See id. at 631; City of Chicago v. ATF, 2001 WL 34088619, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 8, 2001).   
30 Exemption 6 exempts from disclosure “personnel and medical files and 
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion 
of privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).  
31 Exemption 7(A) provides that records “compiled for law enforcement 
purposes” are exempt from disclosure, “but only to the extent that the production of 
such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to 
interfere with law enforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A).   
32 Under Exemption 7(C), “records or information compiled for law 
enforcement purposes” may be withheld “to the extent that the production of such 
law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).  
33 City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago I”), 287 F.3d 628, 632 (7th Cir. 2002); 
City of Chicago, 2001 WL 34088619, at *2.  
34 Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 636.  The Seventh Circuit held that the names and 
addresses of individuals who purchased firearms were not of “such a sensitive nature 
that their disclosure would harm or embarrass the individual,” and so, Exemption 6 
did not apply.  Id.  The court also held that Exemption 7(C) does not apply to any of 
the requested information, and noted that the purchase of a firearm does not raise any 
legitimate privacy concerns as it is not a private transaction and purchasers are on 
notice that their names and addresses will be reported to the proper authorities.  Id. at 
637.  Finally, the court found that disclosure of the information in question would 
not interfere with enforcement proceedings “within the meaning of Exemption 7(A) 
of FOIA.”  Id. at 635; see also City of Chicago v. ATF, 297 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(amending portions of the Chicago I opinion relating to FOIA Exemption 7(A)).  
6
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trafficking, as well as determining whether stricter 
regulation of firearms is necessary. . . . There is a 
strong public policy in facilitating the analysis of 
national patterns of gun trafficking and enabling the 
City to enforce it criminal ordinances.  Disclosure of 
the records sought by the City will shed light on ATF’s 
efficiency in performing its duties and directly serve 
FOIA’s purpose in keeping the activities of government 
agencies open to the sharp eye of public scrutiny.35  
 
The court then affirmed the district court’s decision ordering ATF to 
disclose the requested information to the City.36  
  ATF appealed the Seventh Circuit’s 2002 decision and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.37 However, while the case was 
pending, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution 
of 2003, which contained a rider (“2003 rider”) that prohibited the use 
of appropriated funds “to take any action based upon any provision of 
[FOIA] with respect to records collected or maintained pursuant to 
[certain sections of the GCA],” including the information in 
question.38 Thus, the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s 
judgment and remanded the case back to the court to determine “what 
effect, if any, this rider had on the case.”39  
 
B. Chicago II – Interpreting the 2003 and 2004 Riders 
 
In September 2004, the Seventh Circuit rendered its second 
opinion regarding the City of Chicago’s FOIA request in light of the 
2003 rider and a rider contained in the Consolidated Appropriations 
                                                 
35 Chicago I, 287 F.3d at 637. 
36 Id. at 638.  
37 ATF v. City of Chicago, 537 U.S. 1229, 1229 (2003).  
38 Id.; Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 644, 117 Stat. 11, 473-74 (2003).  
39 City of Chicago, 537 U.S. at 1229.  
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Act of 2004 (“2004 rider”).40 Both riders expressly precluded the use 
of federal funds to disclose the Trace Data, and impliedly, as ATF 
argued, prohibited the disclosure of the data to the public.41 This 
second opinion also introduced a fourth potential exemption to the 
controversy, Exemption 3,42 which permitted government agencies to 
withhold information that was specifically exempt from disclosure by 
another statute. 43 Therefore, the court’s task was to interpret the 2003 
and 2004 riders to determine whether the funding restrictions in effect 
exempted the requested data from disclosure and amounted to a 
substantive change in FOIA.44  
Relying once again on FOIA’s underlying policy “to establish 
a general philosophy of full agency disclosure,” the court stated that 
there is a “strong presumption in favor of disclosure” and that 
exemptions to FOIA are to be interpreted narrowly.45 The court then 
diligently began its interpretation of the 2003 and 2004 riders by first 
reviewing the express language of the two acts.46 After finding no 
express language in either rider exempting the information from 
disclosure, the issue then became whether Congress intended to 
exempt the Trace Data from disclosure, even though it did not 
                                                 
40 Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 53 (2004).; see City of Chicago v. ATF 
(“Chicago II”), 384 F.3d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2004 was passed after the remand by the Supreme Court but 
before the Seventh Circuit reheard the case).  
41 Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 432.  
42 Exemption 3 permits withholding of information that is “specifically 
exempted from disclosure by statute (other than [FOIA]), provided that such statute 
(A) requires that the matter be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave 
no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or 
refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).  
43 Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 432. 
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 432-33 (noting that only direct language had been used to create 
substantive FOIA exemptions in the past, such as language expressly indicating that 
certain information “may be withheld from the public in response to a FOIA 
request.”).  
8
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explicitly indicate such intent. 47 This congressional practice is referred 
to as “repeal by implication.”48 As the court noted, repeals by 
implication are a disfavored practice, especially when the repeal is to 
have occurred through an appropriations measure.49 While 
appropriations acts are permitted to change substantive law, “there is a 
strong presumption that they do not.”50 Further, in the event that 
appropriations legislation conflicts with a substantive statute, the court 
is to narrowly construe the appropriations legislation.51  
The Seventh Circuit outlined the two instances where repeal by 
implication may be found: (1) where one act is “clearly intended as a 
substitute” for the other or (2) where the two statutes are in 
“irreconcilable conflict.”52 The court quickly dismissed the idea that 
either rider was a clearly intended substitute for portions of FOIA.53 It, 
however, gave a great deal of consideration to whether FOIA and the 
funding restrictions imposed by the riders were in irreconcilable 
conflict.54 The court eventually came to the conclusion that there was 
“no irreconcilable conflict between prohibiting the use of federal funds 
to process the request and granting the City access to the databases.”55 
                                                 
47 Id. at 433-34.  
48 Id. at 433.  
49 Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 433 (citing Tenn. Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153, 189-90 (1978) (stating that “the policy [that repeals by implication are 
disfavored] applies with even greater force when the claimed repeal rests solely on 
an Appropriations Act, and that [the Court] recognizes that both substantive 
enactments and appropriations measures are “Acts of Congress,” but the latter have 
the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs.”).  
50 Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 433.; see generally Jack M. Beermann, 
Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84-90 (2006) (briefly 
discussing the controversy surrounding use of appropriations riders, and noting that 
one main criticism is the ability of riders to “fly below the political radar,” by being 
“placed in a bill by a few connected members of Congress and voted on by members 
who may not even be aware of their presence in the bill.”).  
51 Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 433.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 433-34.  
54 Id. at 434-35.  
55 Id. at 435.  
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The Seventh Circuit reasoned that FOIA is mainly focused on ensuring 
that the public has access to agency information, and it “only 
peripherally deals with the allocation of funds.”56 Where 
appropriations legislation had changed substantive law in the past, the 
substantive statutes in most cases had only dealt with the transfer of 
funds; thus, “by making the funds in question unavailable Congress 
was able to squarely defeat the purpose of those statutes.”57  
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the funding 
restrictions imposed by the two riders were merely a procedural 
obstacle that the City could easily overcome and advocated the City’s 
suggestion to use a court-appointed special master, paid for by the 
City, to retrieve the data.58 The court again affirmed the district court’s 
decision and ordered ATF to disclose the Trace Data to the City.59  
 
C. Chicago III – Interpreting the 2005 Rider 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s third and final City of Chicago opinion 
stemmed from the passage of a third rider, the 2005 rider,60 which 
prompted the rehearing of the case and resulted in the reversal of the 
district court’s decision.61 Like the previous two riders, the 2005 rider 
precluded the use of federal funding to access the databases in 
question.62 However, this new rider also contained additional language 
declaring that “all such data shall be immune from legal process.”63 
The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of this language, and in particular 
the phrase “such data,” is the focus of the remainder of this Note and 
the center of this continuing debate.  
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 434.  
58 Id. at 436.  
59 Id.  
60 118 Stat. at 2859-60. 
61 City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago III”), 423 F.3d 777, 778 (7th Cir. 2005). 
62 Id. at 779-80.  
63  Id.; 118 Stat. at 2860.   
10
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 The three-judge panel, consisting of Circuit Judges Bauer, 
Rovner, and Williams, again heard the case in Chicago III.64 Judge 
Bauer, delivering the opinion of the court, began by straightforwardly 
referencing the Seventh Circuit’s history with the case: “For the third 
time in four years, we consider whether [FOIA] entitles the City of 
Chicago to information from the [ATF] databases regarding the sale 
and tracing of firearms.”65 After a brief description of the court’s prior 
decisions and the series of riders that were passed by Congress during 
the pendency of the case, the court set out the language of the 2005 
rider66 and jumped right into a discussion of its meaning.67  
                                                 
64 All three City of Chicago decisions were rendered by Judges William Bauer, 
Ilana Diamond Rovner and Ann Williams, and all three opinions were delivered by 
Judge Bauer.  See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 778; Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 431; City of 
Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago I”), 287 F.3d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 2002). 
65 Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 778.  
66 The 2005 rider provides:  
No funds appropriated under this or any other Act with respect to 
any fiscal year may be used to disclose part or all of the contents 
of the Firearms Trace System database maintained by the National 
Trace Center of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives or any information required to be kept by licensees 
pursuant to section 923(g) of title 18, United States Code, or 
required to be reported pursuant to paragraphs (3) and (7) of such 
section 923(g), to anyone other than a Federal, State, or local law 
enforcement agency or a prosecutor solely in connection with and 
for use in a bona fide criminal investigation or prosecution and 
then only such information as pertains to the geographic 
jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency requesting the 
disclosure and not for use in any civil action or proceeding other 
than an action or proceeding commenced by the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, or a review of such 
an action or proceeding, to enforce the provisions of chapter 44 of 
such title [18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.], and all such data shall be 
immune from legal process and shall not be subject to subpoena or 
other discovery in any civil action in a State or Federal court or in 
any administrative proceeding other than a proceeding commenced 
by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to 
enforce the provisions of that chapter, or a review of such an 
action or proceeding; except that this proviso shall not be 
construed to prevent the disclosure of statistical information 
11
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With little elaboration, the Seventh Circuit agreed with ATF 
that the 2005 rider dramatically changed the legal landscape since the 
court’s 2004 opinion.68 The court stated: “Congress’ obvious intention 
in adding the ‘immune from legal process’ language to the funding 
restriction that existed under prior riders was to cut off access to the 
databases for any reason not related to law enforcement.”69 In short, 
the court interpreted the new rider as prohibiting ATF from acting on 
any request for disclosure of the Trace Data, and providing the 
requesting party with no judicial remedy.70 This reading of the 2005 
rider also made Chicago II’s court-appointed special master solution 
untenable, as the court determined that such a court order was 
unquestionably “legal process” and prohibited under the provisions of 
the new rider.71 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit held that the 2005 
rider qualified as an Exemption 3 statute and substantively changed 
FOIA law by exempting from disclosure data to which the public was 
previously entitled.72 The court reversed the district court’s judgment 
and released ATF from its obligation to give the City access to the 
Trace Data.73  
  
                                                                                                                   
concerning total production, importation, and exportation by each 
licensed importer (as defined in section 921(a)(9) of such title) and 
licensed manufacturer (as defined in section 921(a)(10) of such 
title).  
118 Stat. at 2859-60 (emphasis added highlighting relevant 2005 additions).  
67 Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 779-80. 
68 Id. at 780.  
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 781; see also City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago II”), 384 F.3d 429, 
436 (7th Cir. 2004) (advocating the use of a court-appointed special master to 
retrieve the data).  
72 Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 782. The court also heard and dismissed the City’s 
separation of powers and first amendment arguments, which are beyond the scope of 
this Note.  
73 Id. at 784.  
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 II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S FAULTY INTERPRETATION 
 
Unlike most statutory interpretation cases, the Seventh Circuit 
did not lay out any rules or guidelines in its opinion by which to 
interpret the language of the 2005 rider in Chicago III.74 Instead, the 
court purported to know, from the very beginning, the clear meaning 
of the language, the structure, and the intent of the 2005 rider.75 In its 
analysis, the court repeatedly stated that Congress’ intent to cut off 
access to the Trace Data was clear and unmistakable, citing both the 
use of the language “immune from legal process” and the history of 
the litigation as its reasoning.76  
In fact, throughout the opinion, the Seventh Circuit 
predominantly focused on the language “immune from legal process,” 
and only incidentally addressed the immediately preceding language 
“such data.”77 Even then, the court reluctantly considered the 
possibility that the language “such data” limited the application of the 
rider to the Trace Data in any way.78 In its only mention of the 
construction of the rider and the language “such data,” the court noted: 
“The only data mentioned in the paragraph prior to the reference to 
“such data” is the tracing data and the data regarding multiple sales, 
and those data are the clear antecedent to the phrase ‘such data.’”79 
With this statement, the court surprisingly disregarded all of the 
language contained after the reference to the tracing and multiple sales 
data and before the reference to “such data.”80 The court also did not 
address any other language or structural aspects of the 2005 rider.81  
                                                 
74 See id. at 778-79.   
75 Id. 
76 Chicago III, 423 F.3d. at 780, 782.  
77 Id. at 780-82.  
78 Id. at 780-81.  
79 Id.  
80 See id. The 2005 rider states, in part:  
No funds appropriated under this or any other Act with respect to 
any fiscal year may be used to disclose part or all of [the Trace 
Data], to anyone other than a Federal, State, or local law 
enforcement agency or a prosecutor solely in connection with and 
13
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Finally, the court ignored its own language from Chicago II 
regarding the proper treatment and priority accorded appropriations 
legislation which purported to change substantive law, 82 and quickly 
dismissed the City’s policy concerns on the matter, citing, yet again, 
Congress’ clear intent as its reasoning.83 The court stated: “Even if we 
shared [the City and various amici’s] concerns . . . we cannot ignore 
clear expressions of Congressional intent, regardless of whether the 
end product is an appropriations rider or a statute that has proceeded 
through the more typical avenues of deliberation.”84 The court did not 
address any of FOIA’s policy considerations.85  
 
III. A MORE LOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF “SUCH DATA” 
 
A. Background: City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s faulty reading of the language “such 
data” in the 2005 rider is identified and critiqued in the factually 
                                                                                                                   
for use in a bona fide criminal investigation or prosecution and 
then only such information as pertains to the geographic 
jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency requesting the 
disclosure and not for use in any civil action or proceeding other 
than an action or proceeding commenced by the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, or a review of such 
an action or proceeding, to enforce the provisions of chapter 44 of 
such title [18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.], and all such data shall be 
immune from legal process.  
118 Stat. at 2859-60 (emphasis added highlighting the language disregarded 
by the court).  
81 See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 780-782.  
82 See City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago II”), 384 F.3d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 
2004) (noting that there is “a very strong presumption” that appropriations acts do 
not substantively change existing law, and that when appropriations legislation and a 
substantive statute are in conflict, the appropriations legislation is to be construed 
narrowly).  
83 Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 782.  
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
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similar case of City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.86 Like the 
City of Chicago, the City of New York had brought a nuisance suit 
against the handgun industry for its use of “improper merchandising 
methods that create unnecessary hazards to the people in the City [of 
New York].”87 During discovery, the City of New York served ATF 
with a subpoena to compel disclosure of certain trace data.88 ATF 
refused to comply and argued that the 2004 rider, the same rider that 
was reviewed by the Seventh Circuit in Chicago II, barred the 
disclosure of the requested data.89 Similar to the Seventh Circuit’s 
holding in Chicago II, the magistrate judge at the Eastern District of 
New York held, and the district court later affirmed, that the 2004 
rider only prohibited the use of appropriated funds in making a 
disclosure, and not the disclosure itself.90    
After finding no support with the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, ATF produced some of the requested 
data to the City of New York, and the City of New York filed a motion 
to compel the production of the remaining data.91 By this time, the 
2005 rider had gone into effect and ATF cited the new immunity 
provision of the 2005 rider as grounds for withholding the data.92 
However, rather than interpret the language of the 2005 rider at that 
time, the magistrate judge held, and the district court affirmed, that 
“the [2005] rider could not retroactively relieve ATF of a 
responsibility that [the judge] ordered it to respond to before the rider 
                                                 
86 429 F.Supp.2d at 529.  
87 Id. at 519.  
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 520-21; see City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago II”), 384 F.3d 429, 436 
(7th Cir. 2004).  
90 City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 520-21; see Chicago II, 384 F.3d at 436; 
see also City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 
2004); Johnson v. Bryco Arms, 222 F.R.D. 48, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
91 City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 521.  
92 Id.  
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was passed.”93 Thus, ATF was left with no choice but to turn over the 
data to the City of New York.94  
Nonetheless, in April 2006, the District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York was faced with the task of interpreting a rider 
located within the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006 (“2006 rider”)95 in City of New 
York.96 The 2006 rider was identical to the 2005 rider, but also 
included additional language directly after the 2005 immunity 
provision making “such data…inadmissible in evidence.”97 Thus, the 
City of New York court was faced with the task of interpreting the 
language “such data,” the same language which the Seventh Circuit 
                                                 
93 Id. at 522; see also City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 228 F.R.D. 
134, 146-147 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 228 
F.R.D. 147, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).   
94 City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 522.  
95 Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290, 2295-96 (2005).   
96 429 F.Supp.2d at 522.   
97 Compare 119 Stat. at 2295-96, with 118 Stat. at 2859-60.  The 2006 rider 
provides, in part:  
No funds appropriated under this or any other Act with respect to 
any fiscal year may be used to disclose part or all of the [Trace 
Data], to anyone other than a Federal, State, or local law 
enforcement agency or a prosecutor solely in connection with and 
for use in a bona fide criminal investigation or prosecution and 
then only such information as pertains to the geographic 
jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency requesting the 
disclosure and not for use in any civil action or proceeding other 
than an action or proceeding commenced by the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, or a review of such 
an action or proceeding, to enforce the provisions of chapter 44 of 
such title [18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.], and all such data shall be 
immune from legal process and shall not be subject to subpoena or 
other discovery, shall be inadmissible in evidence, and shall not be 
used, relied on, or disclosed in any manner, nor shall testimony or 
other evidence be permitted based upon such data, in any civil 
action pending on or filed after the effective date of this Act in any 
State (including the District of Columbia) or Federal court.   
119 Stat. at 2295-96 (emphasis added highlighting relevant 2006 additions). 
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determined had one and only one possible meaning – all of the Trace 
Data.98  
 
B. The Eastern District of New York’s Interpretation of “Such Data” 
 
The City of New York court began its analysis of the 2006 rider 
by setting out the appropriate method of statutory interpretation.99 
First, a court should look at the plain language of the statute and 
consider both the bare meaning of the words and their placement and 
purpose in the statutory scheme.100 Second, a court may take into 
account broader congressional policies and “Congress’ awareness of 
its own responsibility to promote the ends of justice in the federal 
court system.”101 Finally, if necessary, a court may look at the 
legislative history of the act.102  
The district court then proceeded to conduct a careful review of 
the entire appropriations act, noting first and foremost that the rider 
was a budgetary provision enacted as part of a vastly larger federal 
spending bill.103 After reviewing the entire section of the 
appropriations act in which the rider appeared, and paying close 
attention to the context in which the language at issue appeared, the 
court concluded that the phrase “such data” could only refer to the data 
to be disclosed to law enforcement agencies, since that was the only 
data for which the use of federal funds was permitted.104 The court 
reasoned: 
 
The 2006 rider bars the use of appropriated funds for 
the future disclosure of ATF trace data to anyone 
                                                 
98 City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 523; see City of Chicago v. ATF 
(“Chicago III”), 423 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2005). 
99 City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 523-24.  
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 524.  
102 Id.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 526.  
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besides law enforcement recipients and then imposes 
further restrictions in order to ensure the proper use of 
data that has been so disclosed. The rider has no 
application to data that is not to be disclosed through 
the use of federally appropriated funds.105  
 
The court went on to provide further support for this reading of 
the phrase “such data” by reviewing the grammatical structure of the 
rider.106 In this effort, the City of New York court focused on the 
portion of the rider which states:  
 
No funds appropriated under this or any other Act . . . 
may be used to disclose part or all of the contents of 
[the Trace Data] to anyone other than a Federal, State, 
or local law enforcement agency . . . and then only such 
information as pertains to the geographic jurisdiction 
of the law enforcement agency requesting the 
disclosure. 107 
 
Unquestionably, the phrase “such information” can only refer to data 
that is to be revealed to law enforcement agencies, as indicated by the 
phrase “the law enforcement agency requesting the disclosure.”108 
Therefore, if the phrase “such data” also referred to the data to be 
disclosed to law enforcement agencies, then the term “such” would 
have the same meaning throughout the rider.109 Interpreting identical 
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 Id.  
107 119 Stat. at 2295-96. The 2006 rider is identical in language and structure 
to the 2005 rider, with the exception of the evidentiary restriction language inserted 
after the phrase “such data shall be immune from the legal process.”  See supra note 
97.  
108 City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 526.  
109 Id. 
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words used in different parts of the same act to have the same meaning 
is the favored practice and the more logical interpretation.110  
Moreover, the court highlighted Congress’ use of the phrase 
“and then only,” which directly precedes “such information” in the 
passage above, as an indication that Congress intended to impose one 
restriction, then apply further restrictions to the originally limited 
subject.111 Under this view, the rider would effectively read as follows: 
“ATF may only use the funds being appropriated to release data to law 
enforcement recipients ‘and then only’ subject to the restrictions 
which follow.”112 Such a reading of the phrase “and then only” is in 
line with the common use of the phrase in other statutes.113 
Finally, aware of the recent Seventh Circuit decision 
interpreting the same language in the 2005 rider, the court noted that it 
“read the decision with interest” and “most respectfully disagree[d] 
with the conclusion of [the Seventh Circuit] in that case.”114 While the 
court acknowledged that the facts in Chicago III differed from the 
facts in City of New York, 115 the court believed that the Seventh 
Circuit’s interpretation of “such data” was nonetheless erroneous.116 
The court stated: 
 
Contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s reading, there are in 
fact two grammatically possible antecedents to the 
phrase “such data” in both the 2005 and the 2006 
riders. “Such data” could, as [Chicago III] concluded, 
                                                 
110 Id. (citing United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988); Sorensen v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 
(1986)).  
111 City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 526.  
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 528.  
115 Id. at 528-29 (noting that ATF had already disclosed the data in question to 
the City of New York pursuant to a court order, whereas in Chicago III, a significant 
portion of the data was never disclosed); see City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago 
III”), 423 F.3d 777, 778-79 (7th Cir. 2005). 
116 City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 528-29.  
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refer to the more general description of the ATF data in 
the first few lines of the riders, but, as already noted 
above, it could also refer to the data to be revealed in 
future disclosures to law enforcement officials. For the 
contextual and grammatical reasons already explained, 
the latter is the more appropriate antecedent to “such 
data.”117  
 
However, in its concluding statements, the court still urged an 
immediate appeal of the case, noting that there was “substantial 
ground for disagreement about a controlling issue of law -- the 
applicability of the 2006 rider to the present litigation.”118 Whether the 
termination of this case will continue to turn on the proper reading of 
the phrase “such data” or on the other congressional policy and 
evidentiary concerns addressed by this case has yet to be determined.   
  
IV. WHY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION MISSED THE MARK 
 
A. Which Interpretation is Correct? 
 
In stark contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Chicago 
III, the City of New York court made no mention of congressional 
intent in its analysis of the 2006 rider.119 Instead, the district court 
focused only on established statutory interpretation and construction 
principles.120 Why was there such a drastic disparity in the two 
interpretations? Surely, no court can deny that with the language 
“immune from legal process” Congress intended to exempt certain 
information from disclosure. However, that was not the controlling 
issue in either case.121 Rather, the controlling issue was, or should 
                                                 
117 Id. at 529.  
118 Id. 
119 Compare Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 780-82, with City of New York, 429 F. 
Supp. 2d at 523-26.  
120 See City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 523-26.  
121 See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 780; City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 523.  
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have been, which category of information Congress intended to 
exempt or restrict through its use of the phrase “such data.”122 The 
Seventh Circuit’s unwavering focus on the former clouded its 
judgment and interpretation of the latter.123 The City of New York 
court, not tied to the “immune from legal process” language, was able 
to engage in a more logical and correct interpretation of “such data.”124   
 When evaluating issues of statutory interpretation, courts are 
to “give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been 
expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be 
regarded as conclusive.”125 Undoubtedly, the Seventh Circuit 
considered this rule of statutory interpretation during its analysis, even 
though it did not explicitly state it.126 However, it is less clear from the 
opinion whether the court was guided by other established principles 
of statutory interpretation.127  
The Seventh Circuit has previously noted that the statute’s text 
is regarded as the “best evidence of the statute’s purpose.”128 
Therefore, courts must strive to “give effect . . . to every clause and 
word of a statute.”129 At the bare minimum, a court interpreting a 
provision of a statute is to “account for a statute’s full text, language, 
as well as punctuation, structure, and subject matter.”130 In a case 
decided by the Seventh Circuit just months before Chicago III, the 
court applied such principles to a particular statute and began its 
                                                 
122 Id.  
123 See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 780-82.  
124 See City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 523-26.  Although the court in City 
of New York interpreted the language “such data,” the same language interpreted by 
the Seventh Circuit, the language “immune from legal process” was not part of or 
relevant to the district court’s analysis.  Id.  
125 Lifschultz Fast Freight Corp. v. Medici, 63 F.3d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(citing Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993)).  
126 See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 780-82 (focusing much of the analysis on 
congressional intent).  
127 Id. 
128 Lifschultz, 63 F.3d at 628.  
129 Id. 
130 Id.  
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inquiry with the following question: “whether the language at issue 
had a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular 
dispute in the case.”131 The court noted that the “plainness or 
ambiguity of the statutory language is determined by reference to the 
language itself, the context in which the language is used, and the 
broader context of the statute as a whole.”132 If the court determined 
that the statutory language was unambiguous and the statutory scheme 
was coherent and consistent, its inquiry would end.133 
In Chicago III, the Seventh Circuit appears to have ended its 
inquiry as soon as it determined what it perceived to be the 
congressional intent, and the actual text and structure of the 2005 rider 
was merely a backdrop to its analysis.134 This is particularly evident 
during the court’s interpretation of the phrase “such data.”135 In 
response to the City’s argument that the phrase “such data” only 
referred to the data requested by law enforcement agencies, the 
Seventh Circuit stated:  
 
Under the City’s strained construction of the statute, the 
portion of the databases in law enforcement’s hands 
would be ‘immune from legal process,’ but the 
remaining portion of the databases, the extensive data 
not produced to law enforcement, would be accessible 
to anyone willing to pay for it. Such a reading would 
thwart Congress’ intention to bar access to the 
databases, and we accordingly reject it.136  
 
                                                 
131 Ioffe v. Skokie Motor Sales, Inc., 414 F.3d 708, 710-11 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(citing Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). 
132 Ioffe, 414 F.3d at 711.  
133 Id. 
134 See City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago III”), 423 F.3d 777, 780-82 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
135 Id. at 780-81.  
136 Id. at 781.  
22
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 13
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/13
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 376
Clearly, rather than using the rider’s text to interpret congressional 
intent, the court is using its already preconceived notion of 
congressional intent to interpret the text.137 In much the same way, the 
court overlooked the significant limiting language included between 
the reference to the Trace Data and the language “such data” in the 
rider.138 As the City of New York court so distinctly pointed out, the 
use of the phrases “such information” and “and then only,” which 
were a part of that limiting language, were vital to the interpretation of 
both the meaning of the language “such data” and the rider as a 
whole.139 
More significantly, the Seventh Circuit ignored FOIA’s policy 
considerations, failing to even mention, as it had in its prior two 
opinions, that there is a strong presumption in favor of disclosure 
under FOIA and that its exemptions are to be narrowly construed.140 
Instead, the Seventh Circuit adopted the broadest reading of the 2005 
rider possible.141 Although there was no FOIA issue in City of New 
York, as the information had already been disclosed, the 2006 rider 
also contained an evidentiary restriction, which, like a FOIA 
exemption, was to be narrowly construed by the court.142 Relying on 
this principle, the City of New York court noted that “there [was] no 
need to construe this budgetary provision more broadly than necessary 
– a construction requiring the assumption that Congress was acting 
irrationally and in opposition to its long-standing policy regarding the 
administration of justice.”143 In light of FOIA’s long-standing goals 
                                                 
137 Id.  
138 Id. at 780-81 
139 See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 429 F.Supp.2d 517, 526 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006).   
140 See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 780-82; City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago 
II”), 384 F.3d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 2004); City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago I”), 287 
F.3d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 2002).  
141 See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 781 (holding that the rider refers “generally to 
the multiple sales and tracing data, rather than to some subset of the data.”).  
142 See City of New York, 429 F.Supp.2d at 528.  
143 Id. 
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and policies,144 the same principle should have guided the court’s 
interpretation of the 2005 rider in Chicago III.145 
 
B. FOIA is Wounded by the Seventh Circuit’s Decision 
 
The Seventh Circuit’ decision in Chicago III essentially gave a 
green light to those who wish to exploit Exemption 3 of FOIA and 
restrict the public’s access to information without debate or question.  
Exemption 3, which provides that information specifically exempted 
from disclosure by statute may be withheld, combined with Congress’ 
increasing use of appropriations riders to change substantive law, 
widens the potential for government agencies to bypass FOIA’s 
disclosure requirements.146 In effect, as the Chicago III decision 
demonstrated, a simple rider inserted in a large federal spending bill 
may create a new exemption and substantively change FOIA law 
without being subject to the formal legislative procedures typically 
required for such changes.147 While this problematic use of 
appropriations riders is not specific to FOIA,148 the importance of 
addressing it in this context has only escalated under the Bush 
Administration and its more secretive policies.149 Members of 
                                                 
144 See S. 394 § 2.   
145 See 423 F.3d at 781-82.   
146 See generally Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Low Riding, 110 YALE L. J. 
1089, 1093-95 (2001) (stating that there has been a significant rise in the number of 
substantive laws passed through appropriations legislation in the last half-century, 
and calling for modification of this practice and a return to the full and formal 
legislative process). 
147 Id.; 423 F.3d at 782.  
148 See Rapp, supra note 146, at 1093-95.  
149 See Jane E. Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in a Time of Terror: 
The Bush Administration’s Assault on Freedom of Information, 11 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 479, 482-84 (2006) (stating that the Bush Administration’s actions have 
amounted to an unprecedented “organized assault on freedom of information.”); see 
also Joshua Apfelroth, The Open Government Act: A proposed Bill to Ensure the 
Efficient Implementation of the Freedom of Information Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 219, 
225 (2006) (describing the Bush Administration’s approach to FOIA as 
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Congress have also expressed their concern on this issue, stating that 
“new exemptions should not be created lightly,” and that “individual 
statutory exemptions should be vigorously debated before lawmakers 
vote in favor of them.”150 
 Notably, the fear of Exemption 3 becoming overly broad and 
inclusive has been addressed by Congress in the past.151 In 1976, 
Congress amended Exemption 3 in direct response to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in FAA v. Robertson,152 in which the Court held that 
general statutory language, without further specification of documents 
to be withheld, was sufficient to qualify as an Exemption 3 statute.153  
In that amendment, Congress set the specific qualifications criteria in 
effect today in order to narrow the number of statutes which could 
qualify under the exemption.154 Federal courts were then left with the 
task of policing the new standard.155 Considering the Seventh Circuit’s 
recent Exemption 3 analysis, and all of the above concerns, the time 
may again be ripe for a FOIA amendment.156   
   
                                                                                                                   
“discouraging agencies from disclosing records if the agency can invoke any 
technical grounds for withholding them under FOIA.”).  
150 See Kirtley, supra note 149, at 507-08 (citing Representative Henry 
Waxman and Senator Patrick Leahy’s comments, respectively, in response to two 
proposed bills which impact FOIA. One proposed bill provides that “any future 
legislation to establish a new exemption to [FOIA] be stated explicitly within the 
text of the bill.”).  
151 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice, 1 ADMIN. L. & 
PRAC. § 3.38 (2d ed. 2006).  
152 422 U.S. 255, 265 (1975).  
153 See Koch, supra note 151.  
154 Id.  
155 Id. 
156 See City of Chicago v. ATF (“Chicago III”), 423 F.3d 777, 782 (7th Cir. 
2005); see also Kirtley, supra note 149, at 507-08 (provides a brief description of 
two proposed bills to reform FOIA, both by promoting public disclosure and an open 
government, and both of which may resolve the problems addressed in this Note. 
Both bills are still awaiting committee review).  
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The Seventh Circuit’s faulty interpretation of the 2005 rider in 
Chicago III not only resulted in an unwarranted substantive change in 
FOIA, at least as perceived by the Seventh Circuit,157 but also exposed 
a dangerous new loophole in FOIA legislation which could potentially 
allow government agencies to unquestionably withhold information 
from the public.158 FOIA provides a powerful tool for the American 
people, and is a hallmark of our system of democracy.159 Until the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in 2005, FOIA could have provided the 
means for the City of Chicago to obtain information with which to 
combat gun trafficking and shed light on the activities of ATF. 
However, without proper debate or questioning in Congress, the City 
of Chicago’s right to this information under FOIA was stripped away.  
Congress provided for judicial review of FOIA denials in order to 
monitor federal agencies’ claims of secrecy and entitlement to 
exemptions.160 It did so with the hope that the judicial review, a vital 
part of our constitutional system of checks and balances, would be 
more than a mere “judicial sanctioning of agency discretion.”161 Thus, 
it is imperative that federal courts continue to thoroughly scrutinize 
and narrowly construe both new and existing exemptions to FOIA 
which might further restrict FOIA’s purpose and effectiveness.  
                                                 
157 See Chicago III, 423 F.3d at 782; City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 429 F.Supp.2d 517, 529 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
158 See Beermann, supra note 50, at 88-89.  
159 Meredith Fuchs, supra note 5, at 144 (noting that “Congress designed FOIA 
to make democratic participation and citizen oversight a reality.”).  
160 Id. at 159.  
161 Id.  
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